자. 오늘도 가봅니다.
언제나 그렇듯이 번역에 태클걸어주시면 오히려 대환영입니다!
(사실 태클걸리길 바랄 지경입니다. 그래야 생산적일테니까요.)
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https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-january-25-2023/
1. 젤렌스키가 탱크를 몰고가서 러시아 국경을 넘어가도 미국이 괜찮겠어?
QUESTION: Right. Thanks, Ned. On the Ukraine tanks – and I’m not really expecting that you’ll have a whole lot more to add than – to what the Pentagon and the White House and the President have already said. But I just wanted to know if the U.S. has placed conditions on the supply of Abrams tanks. In other words, is it okay with you guys if the – if – when the Ukrainians get these tanks, for them to roll over into Crimea? Is it okay for them to roll over the border into Belarus, into Russia? Or have you told them, no, you can only use these when you get them – this is just the Abrams; I’m not talking about the other ones.
---> 제곧내입니다. 그런데 이 부분은 '괜찮다, 아니냐'라기 보다는 다른 것들을 볼 필요가 있습니다.
---> 일단 이 단락에서는 탱크를 주면 우크라이나가 러시아 점령지 혹은 국경을 넘어 갈 수 있다는 인식자체가 존재한다는 것에 주목할 필요가 있습니다. 그만큼 개전직후와 1년여가 지났을때 전황을 바라보는 사람들의 시각이 완전히 다르다는 겁니다.
---> 그나저나 이쯤부터 아예 Matt Lee가 맨 처음 질문을 도맡아서 하고 있네요.
MR PRICE: Sure. So, Matt, on every single element of security assistance we’ve provided, there has been one and really only one condition placed on it. That is the fact that everything we’ve provided is for Ukraine’s self-defense. Everything we have provided is to enable our Ukrainian partners to take on, effectively and successfully, the Russian aggression – the Russian invaders that have crossed internationally recognized borders to be on sovereign Ukrainian territory. That is the case with today’s latest announcements – latest announcement of Abrams tanks. It’s the case with every other system we have provided going back to the elements that we provided prior to February 24th of last year: the Stingers, the Javelins, the anti-air, anti-armor systems that are also defensive in nature.
---> 일단은 미국(과 서방세계)가 우크라이나에 제공한 자산들은 모두 방어를 위한 것이라고 말은 해두고 있습니다.
Everything we have provided is with that in mind. Our Ukrainian partners know that. They respect that. And when it comes to what they pursue, when they pursue, and how they pursue it on their own sovereign territory, that is absolutely their decision. DOD, of course, has an active dialogue with the Ukrainian military and their counterparts about how most effectively to take on Russian invaders, but these are sovereign decisions on the part of the Ukrainian Government regarding where, when, and how to strike back at Russian forces who are on their sovereign territory.
---> 그리고 우크라이나 측에서도 그 점을 인지하고 있으며 존중하고 있다고 하네요.
---> 그렇지만 여지도 남겨두고 있습니다. 우크라이나측 주권이 미치는 영토(sovereign territory)에 위치한 러시아 군에 대한 사항들은 우크라이나의 주권적 결정들(sovereign decisions)이라는 겁니다. 저는 당장 크림반도가 떠오르네요.
QUESTION: Okay. And just – just to make clear, the use of allied weapons by Ukraine into Crimea is not prohibited?
--> 그러면 서방세계가 제공해준 무기들이 크림반도로 쇄도하는건 금지되지 않은 사항인가? 역시 Matt. 중요한건 끝까지 물고 늘어집니다.
MR PRICE: We – our —
QUESTION: Because you still – you consider Ukraine – I mean Crimea to be part of Ukraine. So —
MR PRICE: Most importantly, first of all —
QUESTION: So that would be – so that would be defensive?
MR PRICE: Most importantly, first of all, Crimea is Ukraine. That has been our position since 2014. That is our position now. That will be our position going forward. That will never change.
---> 고마워요 Matt. 어디까지나 우크라이나군의 역량에 달려있는 사항이긴 하지만, 그래도 크림반도가 우크라이나측의 목표가 되는데 제한사항이 없다는 점은 우리 모두가 알 수 있게 되었습니다. 미국이 크림반도는 우크라이나의 영토로 인식하고 있으니 말입니다.
When it comes to the security assistance we are providing, that has of course evolved over time. I don’t need to offer a reminder of that, as President Biden just today announced the provision of a new capability. We have been responsive to the discussion we’ve had with our Ukrainian partners, a discussion that is predicated on what they need and when they need it. So of course we are providing them with the systems they need to confront Russian invaders and aggressors where the battle is now. Right now, the battle is in the Donbas, the battle is in the east. The capability that we’re talking about today will enable our Ukrainian partners, will provide them another capability that they can use to take on Russian invaders in this part of their sovereign territory, just as we provided other systems that will help them do the same.
---> 문단이 길지만 한마디로 요약하자면 '우크라이나측이 필요로 하는 자산이 있으면 무엇이든 제공해주겠다'입니다. 다만, 이 글을 쓰는 2월 23일도 그러하고 이 브리핑 당시였던 1월 말도 그러하고 주된 전투는 우크라이나 동부에서 있어왔으니 그쪽 전투에 필요로 하는 자산을 보내줄 것이다라는 말입니다.
---> 다만, 또다른 여지도 남겨두고 있습니다. 우리(미국 및 서방세계)는 우크라이나측이 그들의 주권이 미치는 영토(sovereign territory)에서 러시아 침략자들을 물리치는데 쓸 수 있는 또다른 역량(another capability)도 제공해줄 것이다. 그냥 capability라면 그냥 뭐 계속 지원해주겠다라는 말로 받아들이면 되는데 another capability라고 말하고 있습니다. 너무 심각하게 말을 파고드는 느낌도 들지만 어쩌면 중요한 디테일일지도 모르겠습니다.
* 이 뒤로 한참동안 전차지원에 대한 이야기들이 이어지지만 역시 영양가는 없어 보여서 생략.
2. 우크라이나의 미래에 대한 것들
QUESTION: So just to summarize, the administration believes that it’s more likely that Russia could back off militarily if Ukraine has more advanced weaponry?
MR PRICE: It is – two things, really. One, we’re talking about putting Ukraine in the strongest possible position for the aggression that it’s facing now. This aggression is, as President Zelenskyy has said, almost certainly going to end at the negotiating table. We want Ukraine to be in the strongest possible position when that table emerges. That’s why we’re providing them with the presidential drawdown authority, the 30 PDAs that we’ve announced so far, the 27-, nearly $28 billion in security assistance that we’ve provided so far.
But when that time comes and there is an end to this conflict, we want that resulting peace to be just – and I won’t go through that again – but to be durable – “durable” meaning it is not just a moment in time where a week later, a month later, a year later, or 10 years ago, Russia decides to rest, regroup, refit, and re-attack. We want to equip Ukraine with deterrent capabilities, but also defensive capabilities, if Russia once again makes a disastrous decision to cross international borders and to re-attack Ukraine in the future.
---> 일단 현재의 미국은 우크라이나가 협상장에서 최대한 우세에 있기를 원하고 있습니다. 그래서 현재까지 대통령 직권으로 280억달러 가량의 안보지원금을 제공해줬고요.
---> 그리고 이 전쟁이 끝나고도 지속되는 평화를 원한다고 합니다. 평화의 지속성을 위해 미국은 우크라이나가 억제(deterrent)뿐만 아니라 방어(defensive)역량을 갖추길 원한다고 합니다. 만약 러시아가 또다시 우크라이나를 재공격했을때를 위해서요. 즉, 러시아로 하여금 전쟁을 하지 않게 느끼게 하는 역량(억제)이 아니라 실제로 러시아와 싸워 이길 수 있는 역량(방어)을 갖추길 원한다는 겁니다.
QUESTION: Can I change the subject?
MR PRICE: Anything else on this? Yeah. Okay, go ahead.
QUESTION: Two things, first. Is that the approach for the post-war era in which there is no security guarantees under Article 5 for Ukraine(* 일본과 미국 간의 상호 협력 및 안전 보장 조약 5조를 비유로 들고 있음), instead given weapons, and we’ll send the economic reforms in Ukraine in order to make it in a stronger position? Is that the approach that you are pursuing? And second, do you have any response to the Russian ambassador in Washington in light of today’s announcement in which he says that it’s obvious that Washington is trying to inflict a strategic defeat on the – on Russia. Do you have any comment about that?
---> 한마디로 줄이자면 앞으로 미국은 우크라이나를 직접 지켜줄 것이냐(* 일본처럼), 아니면 안보 및 경제원조만 지원해줄 것이냐는 질문입니다.
MR PRICE: On that second question, Moscow has already inflicted a strategic failure on itself. We’ve seen the strategic failure since the earliest days of this war, when President Putin sent his forces into Ukraine under the erroneous assumption that Kyiv would fall; that the country would be his; that more so than the territorial conquest, that he’d be in a position to erase Ukraine, erase its identity, erase its people, subsume the country. Obviously, that has failed. It has been a strategic failure, and that is precisely a result of Russia’s own actions.
---> 두번째 질문에 대한 답변. 미국이 러시아에게 전략적 패배를 안겼다(inflict)는 주미 러시아대사의 답변에 프라이스 대변인은 그건 러시아가 자초한 전략적 실패(failure)라고 반박한 겁니다.
On the first part of your question, two points. One, NATO’s door remains open. This is in some ways what this aggression is all about, the fact that this is a defensive alliance – NATO, the world’s strongest defensive alliance – that has an open door policy. That door will never be closed. And in fact, it will always be open to those countries who aspire to join this defensive alliance and who meet the membership criteria in order to do so.
---> 첫번째 질문에 대한 답중의 하나. 우크라이나가 NATO에 가입하는게 가능하다는 겁니다. 어차피 이미 러시아가 우크라이나를 실제로 침공해버린 이상 젤렌스키 행정부가 원한다면 못할 건 없기도 합니다.
Now, leaving apart NATO, we want to make sure that regardless of Kyiv’s choices going forward, of NATO’s decisions going forward, that Ukraine is in a position to deter and to defend itself, if necessary, against potential aggression over the longer term. This is about equipping Ukraine and making real that idea of a peace that is both just and durable. And the durability part of that requires us to make not only these short-term investments in Ukraine – providing them with what they need when they need it, at the moment they need it, but also over the longer term so that when this war ends, when Russia’s aggression ends, if Russia once again makes a disastrous decision – whether that’s a week, a month, a year, a decade later – that Ukraine is prepared to defend itself.
---> 첫번째 질문에 대한 또다른 답. NATO에 가입하지 않는다 하여도 러시아가 우크라이나를 재침공하였을때 우크라이나 스스로 러시아를 억제하고 방어할 수 있도록 준비되어 있어야 한다는 겁니다. 이를 위해서 우리(미국과 서방세계까지인듯)는 단기적 투자뿐만 아니라 우크라아이나 측이 원하는 것을 원하는 때에 제공해줘야할 필요가 있을 것이라고도 첨언하고 있습니다.
---> 두 가지 경우 모두 결국 지원은 해주겠지만 우크라이나는 자기를 자기 스스로 지켜내야한다는 전제가 깔려있습니다. 다르게 말하자면 기자가 예시로 든 일본 그리고 또다른 나라인 한국은 미국에게 매우 특별대우를 받고 있다는 결론도 낼 수 있습니다.
3. 이란, 북한, 중국에게 손벌리는 러시아
QUESTION: Do you have any concerns that today’s announcement will push Russia to expand its cooperation for weaponries from countries like Iran, North Korea, or even China?
---> 말 그대로 요즘 러시아가 이란, 북한, 중국과 무기조달을 위해 협력을 확장하고 있는데 이에 대한 코멘트를 요청했습니다.
MR PRICE: Russia is seeking these wares from other countries because its ability to produce them at home has been systematically blocked, not by the United States acting alone, not by any one other country acting alone, but by dozens of countries instituting sanctions, financial controls, export controls on the Russian economy. This has been a very deliberate strategy to starve the Russian war-making machine of the ability to indigenously produce what it needs to propagate this war against Ukraine.
---> 한마디로 말하자면 러시아가 온갖 제재를 먹었기 때문에 무기조달 능력이 체계적으로 저해되었다는 겁니다.
Now, that doesn’t mean that Russia is in the near term at least any less dangerous because it has turned to Iran, it has turned to the DPRK. It’s seeking alternate sources of these wares. But it’s important to us that we institute these measures so that over time we will shrink Russia’s ability to propel force beyond its borders to engage in something like this once again.
---> 그렇지만 러시아가 덜 위험한 존재가 되진 않았다고 합니다. 왜냐하면 이란이건 북한이건 대체지들을 찾아나서기 때문입니다. 그럼에도 불구하고 러시아의 전쟁 수행역량을 억제하기 위해서는 필요한 조치라고 설명하고 있습니다.
4. 중국과 미국. 핵감축 협정의 중요성은?
* 2월 4일로 예정되었던 블링컨 미 국무장관의 방중은 정찰풍선 건으로 인해 무기한 연기되었음
** 푸틴 대통령은 바로 어제인 2월 22일 미러 핵감축 협정인 New START 협상에 대해 참여중단을 선언하였음.
https://m.khan.co.kr/world/world-general/article/202302211952001
Yes.
QUESTION: Upcoming Security Blinken’s trip to China(* 2월 4일 예정되었던 미 국무장관 방중) – at this point there is no nuclear arms reduction agreement between PRC and United States or Russia. Given the fact, is Secretary going to – also going to talk about nuclear disarmament in China? And more broadly, how do you think the importance to sign such a deal with PRC?
---> 지금 당장은 중국, 미국, 러시아간의 핵협상 협정이 이루어질 가능성은 보이지 않으나, 일단 중국과의 이런 핵감축 협정의 중요성에 대해서 어떻게 생각하냐는 질문.
MR PRICE: A couple of things. We’ve – I’ve made very clear that we’re just not going to get into the agenda this far ahead of the travel. I expect we may have more to say on that in the coming days, next couple of weeks. But we want to allow space for Secretary Blinken to engage in the meaningful and constructive diplomacy that we hope to find in Beijing. But broadly speaking, Secretary Blinken will have an opportunity to carry forward the conversation that President Biden had with President Xi in Bali late last year. And that was a conversation predicated on how we can responsibly manage what is the most consequential bilateral relationship that we have probably on the face of the planet, a conversation that seeks to ensure that the stiff competition that we’re engaged in with the PRC doesn’t veer into conflict.
--> 일단 2월 4일로 예정되었던 미 국무장관 블링컨의 방중때 다룰 사안이 아님을 확실하게 밝히고 있습니다. 그리고 미중관계를 관리하는것이 얼마나 중대한 일인지를 먼저 배경지식으로써 설명해주고 있습니다.
---> 미중관계는 이 행성에서 가장 중대한 양자관계로써 팽팽한 경쟁(competition)을 분쟁(conflict)로 비화시키지 않기 위한 대화로써 관여하고 있다고 말입니다.
As part of that we’re going to discuss the areas of competition. We are going to discuss those areas that have the potential to be conflictual, where we hope to establish those guardrails to see to it that competition doesn’t veer into conflict, but to also discuss those areas where we see the potential for further cooperation with the PRC. And principally, these are going to be on transnational challenges, challenges like changing climate, COVID, drugs, fentanyl, precursors, essentially threats to people around the world, threats that know no borders. But, of course, it is in our interest, as it is in the PRC’s interest, that we be able to discuss strategic stability broadly. We’ve noted with some concern the growing size of the PRC’s arsenal. There have been various public reports that have been written about this. Of course, it is an issue that we seek to discuss. We believe responsible nuclear powers need to act responsibly; they need to engage in discussions of strategic stability to see to it that the world’s most powerful weapons are managed appropriately and that our respective stockpiles are handled appropriately.
So all of these are issues that we seek to discuss with the PRC. We’ll have an opportunity to do – to do some of that in the coming weeks.
---> 미중은 의논할때 경쟁의 영역으로써 다룰 것들이 있지만, 경쟁에서 분쟁적이 될 영역으로써 가드레일을 마련하여 분쟁으로 비화되지 않게 다뤄야 할 것도 있고, 앞으로 협력의 영역으로 다룰 수 있을 것도 있다고 합니다.
---> 이 부분은 좀 중언부언한다는 인상이 느껴지네요.
---> 아무튼 중국의 핵에 대해서는 미국도 의논하고자 모색하고 있는 이슈라고 합니다. 미국은 핵무장 국가는 책임감있게 행동해야 한다고 생각하며, 중국(they)은 전략적 안정성에 대한 의논에 관여할 필요가 있다고 첨언했습니다.
-