[오..누네띠네]호주의 절박감이 느껴지는 문서 / National Defence - Defence Strategic Review (2023)
작성자cjs5x5작성시간23.11.26조회수149 목록 댓글 0요즘은 기존의 알바와 함께, 일인지 취미인지 모를 작업을 하고 있느라 시간을 못내고 있습니다.
작업중에 필요해서 여러나라들의 국방백서 혹은 그에 준하는 문서들을 읽어내리고 있는데, 호주의 것에서 유독 절박감이 묻어났습니다. 그래서 한번 소개드리고 싶네요. 아마 가독성은 최악일거 같지만.
원본은 여기서 다운로드.
https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review
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일단 호주는 여태껏 지리적 위치로 인해 평화롭게 지내다가, 인도-태평양 전역에서 벌어지는 미중간 대결속에서 2차대전 이래 최대의 위기를 맞이했습니다. 또한 전쟁의 방식까지 바뀌었고요.
<National Defence - Defence Strategic Review 2023>, 2023, Australian Government, pp.23-25.
Australia’s strategic circumstances
1.1 The primary responsibility of the Australian Government is to protect the sovereignty and security of the nation to enable its people to live in peace and prosperity.
1.2 At times, the strategic risks faced by Australia have been significant. In the early post-Second World War period, the onset of the Cold War, the risk of a third world war and the threat of nuclear armageddon were real prospects. Australia, however, was geographically remote from the strategic centre of gravity in Europe and the Northern Hemisphere. Regional conflicts in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s posed a threat in the near region, but no power in the (now called) Indo-Pacific could contest the United States or fundamentally challenge or change the United States-led post-war order.
1.3 In the latter Cold War period, Australia faced no direct military threat. The post-Cold War era that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union featured the emergence of the United States-led unipolar order. The Global War on Terror era, although politically and militarily very significant, did not pose an existential threat to Australia, nor to the United States-led regional strategic order.
1.4 Australia’s strategic circumstances and the risks we face are now radically different. No longer is our Alliance partner, the United States, the unipolar leader of the Indo-Pacific. Intense China-United States competition is the defining feature of our region and our time. Major power competition in our region has the potential to threaten our interests, including the potential for conflict. The nature of conflict and threats have also changed.
1.5 Regional countries continue to modernise their military forces. China’s military build-up is now the largest and most ambitious of any country since the end of the Second World War. This has occurred alongside significant economic development, benefiting many countries in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia. This build-up is occurring without transparency or reassurance to the Indo-Pacific region of China’s strategic intent. China’s assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea threatens the global rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific in a way that adversely impacts Australia’s national interests. China is also engaged in strategic competition in Australia’s near neighbourhood.
<National Defence - Defence Strategic Review 2023>, 2023, Australian Government, pp.27-28.
2.5 Australia’s contemporary regional security situation is now characterised by:
● strategic competition between the major powers;
● the use of coercive tactics;
● the acceleration and expansion of military capabilities without necessary transparency;
● the rapid translation of emerging and disruptive technologies into military capability;
● nuclear weapons proliferation; and
● the increased risk of miscalculation or misjudgement.
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그래서 이 리뷰를 작성한 사람들은 이렇게 외치고 있습니다.
"우리 군대를 싹 다 바꿔야 해요! 전국가적인 역량을 다 쏟아부어서! 라잇 나우!"
1.6 As a consequence, for the first time in 80 years, we must go back to fundamentals, to take a first-principles approach as to how we manage and seek to avoid the highest level of strategic risk we now face as a nation: the prospect of major conflict in the region that directly threatens our national interest.
1.7 As a result of this new strategic reality, our view is that this is not ‘just another Defence review’ that will shuffle available resources, or tweak the balance of the ADF. This Review, in conjunction with the acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines, will reshape the force structure, posture and capability of Defence for coming decades – and necessarily so.
1.8 The strategic risks we face require the implementation of a new approach to planning, force posture, force structure, capability development and acquisition.
1.13 In the post-Second World War period, Australia was protected by its geography and the limited ability of other nations in the region to project power. Defence and the nation had a 10-year warning time as the foundation for planning, capability development and preparedness for conflict.
1.14 In the contemporary strategic era, we cannot rely on geography or warning time. Regional military modernisation, underpinned by economic development, has meant that more countries are able to project combat power across greater ranges in all five domains: maritime, land, air, space and cyber. Emerging and disruptive technologies are being rapidly translated into military capability.
1.15 While there is at present only a remote possibility of any power contemplating an invasion of our continent, the threat of the use of military force or coercion against Australia does not require invasion. More countries are able to project combat power across greater ranges, including against our trade and supply routes, which are vital for Australia’s economic prosperity. Cyber warfare is not bound by geography. The rise of the ‘missile age’ in modern warfare, crystallised by the proliferation of long-range precision strike weapons, has radically reduced Australia’s geographic benefits, the comfort of distance and our qualitative regional capability edge.
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"예전 방식이요? 더 이상은 안되요!"
국방백서 여러개를 읽으니 공통된 패턴이 보입니다. 바로 'holistic approach'. 전일적 접근.
온 국가의 모든 방면들의 모든 역량을 쏟아부어 새로운 전략적 환경에 적응해내야한다는 겁니다.
<National Defence - Defence Strategic Review 2023>, 2023, Australian Government, pp.27-28.
The transition to National Defence
3.7 Major power competition involves threats and risks far beyond and quantifiably different to any faced since the end of the Second World War. Australia’s current strategic circumstances require a new strategic conceptual approach.
3.8 It requires re-examining the traditional notion of the Defence of Australia concept. That doctrine is no longer suitable. There is a requirement for a new, holistic approach to Australian defence planning and strategy. We must adopt a new strategic conceptual approach of National Defence, which encompasses the defence of Australia against potential threats arising from major power competition, including the prospect of conflict.
3.9 National Defence must be part of a broader national strategy of whole-ofgovernment coordinated and focused statecraft and diplomacy in our region. This approach requires much more active Australian statecraft that works to support the maintenance of a regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
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한편, 미국의 역할은 더욱 중요해졌습니다. 특히 호주는 아예 이렇게 고백합니다.
"우린 미국없으면 안될거야."
<National Defence - Defence Strategic Review 2023>, 2023, Australian Government, pp.37-38.
4.8 However, Australia does not have effective defence capabilities relative to higher threat levels. In the present strategic circumstances, this can only be achieved by Australia working with the United States and other key partners in the maintenance of a favourable regional environment. Australia also needs to develop the capability to unilaterally deter any state from offensive military action against Australian forces or territory.
4.10 In our current strategic circumstances, the risk of nuclear escalation must be regarded as real. Our best protection against the risk of nuclear escalation is the United States’ extended nuclear deterrence, and the pursuit of new avenues of arms control.
<National Defence - Defence Strategic Review 2023>, 2023, Australian Government, p.45.
6 Defence Partnerships
6.1 To protect Australia’s strategic interests, we must contribute to the maintenance of a regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific that is favourable to our interests.
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The United States Alliance
6.2 Australia’s strategic culture has long been based on a major power alliance. Every Australian Government since Federation has assessed our strategic circumstances and reaffirmed the centrality of an alliance partnership in relationship to our strategic interests.
6.3 Contrary to some public analysis, our Alliance with the United States is becoming even more important to Australia. This will increasingly include working more closely with the United States and other partners. Recent advances in the United States-Japan Alliance and the Australia-Japan Special Strategic Partnership, as well as the Australia-United States-Japan trilateral relationship, are key indicators of the deepening relationships between the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.
6.4 The Australia-United States Alliance, enabled through the ANZUS Treaty, will continue to grow and adapt. In the context of the Alliance and the deteriorating strategic environment, Australia must be more self-reliant so we are able to contribute more to regional stability.
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그래도 호주는 자신들이 세계속에서 어떠한 배역을 맡아야 할지 알고 있는듯 합니다.
<National Defence - Defence Strategic Review 2023>, 2023, Australian Government, p.6
In this environment, we must sharpen our focus on what our interests are, and how to uphold them. Our focus needs to be on: how we ensure our fate is not determined by others; how we ensure our decisions are our own; and how we protect our way of life, our prosperity, our institutions and our economy.
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Australia’s strategic posture
The defence of Australia lies in the collective security of the Indo-Pacific.
The defence of Australia’s national interests lies in the protection of our economic connection with the world and the maintenance of the global rules-based order.
Accordingly, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) must have the capacity to:
● defend Australia and our immediate region;
● deter through denial any adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches;
● protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world;
● contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and
● contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.
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이 배역을 맡기 위해 호주는 이런 것들을 연습하기로 한 거 같습니다.
한마디로 줄이자면 합동군에서 통합군(Integrated Forces)로의 변혁입니다. 육-해-공-우주-사이버의 상호운용성을 강화한다는 겁니다.
<National Defence - Defence Strategic Review 2023>, 2023, Australian Government, p.19.
Force design and force structure
To maximise the deterrence, denial and response options for the Government, the ADF must evolve into a genuine Integrated Force which harnesses effects across all five domains: maritime, land, air, space and cyber.
The ADF’s operational success will depend on the ability of the Integrated Force to apply the following critical capabilities:
● undersea warfare capabilities (crewed and uncrewed) optimised for persistent, long-range sub-surface intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike;
● an enhanced long-range strike capability in all domains;
● a fully enabled, integrated amphibious-capable combined-arms land system;
● enhanced, all-domain, maritime capabilities for sea denial operations and localised sea control;
● a theatre command and control framework that enables an enhanced Integrated Force; and
● a developed network of northern bases to provide a platform for logistics support, denial and deterrence.
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또한 뉴스에 남중국해 지도와 자주 나오는 A2/AD. 반접근/지역거부 전략은 중국만 채택한게 아닙니다.
그리고 마지막 문장에 주목하시기 바랍니다. 이게 미국이 호주에게 핵추진 공격잠수함(SSN)을 준 이유입니다.
<National Defence - Defence Strategic Review 2023>, 2023, Australian Government, p.49.
7 Defence Strategy and Force Design
Defence strategy
7.1 Based on the Review’s assessment of our current strategic environment, we recommend the Government directs Defence to adopt a strategy of denial.
Strategy of denial
A strategy of denial is a defensive approach designed to stop an adversary from succeeding in its goal to coerce states through force, or the threatened use of force, to achieve dominance.
Denial is associated with the ability and intent to defend against, and defeat, an act of aggression.
7.2 For Australia, this strategy of denial must be focused on our primary area of military interest. The key is the presence of a robust ADF. The strategy of denial must also recognise the importance of non-geographic security threats, including cyber, space and long-range missile capabilities.
7.3 A strategy of denial for the ADF must focus on the development of anti-access/area denial capabilities (A2AD). Anti-access capabilities are usually long-range and designed to detect an adversary and prevent an advancing adversary from entering an operational area. Area-denial capabilities are shorter range and designed to limit an adversary’s freedom of action within a defined operational area. A2AD is often synonymous with long-range strike capability, undersea warfare and surface-to-air missiles.
<National Defence - Defence Strategic Review 2023>, 2023, Australian Government, pp.53-55.
8.8 In effecting our strategy of denial in Australia’s northern approaches, the ADF’s operational success will depend on the ability of the Integrated Force to apply the following critical capabilities:
● undersea warfare capabilities (crewed and uncrewed) optimised for persistent, long-range sub-surface intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and strike;
● an enhanced, integrated targeting capability;
● an enhanced long-range strike capability in all domains;
● a fully enabled, integrated amphibious-capable combined-arms land system;
<National Defence - Defence Strategic Review 2023>, 2023, Australian Government, pp.56-58.
8.19 Our strategic circumstances now require that our naval capability contributes effectively to the ADF’s ability to shape our strategic environment, deter potential adversaries and deny their ability to achieve objectives contrary to our national interests.
8.20 The acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines will transform Navy’s capability. Nuclear-powered submarines are key assets both in effecting a strategy of denial and in the provision of anti-submarine warfare and long-range strike options.
8.21 An enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet, that complements a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet, is now essential given our changed strategic circumstances.
'Asymmetric capability'. 비대칭적 역량. 대만도 그렇지만 호주도 추구하는 바입니다. 아무래도 우크라이나전이 여러나라 군대에게 크게 감명을 준듯 합니다.
<National Defence - Defence Strategic Review 2023>, 2023, Australian Government, pp.71-73.
9.5 The success of AUKUS is essential for Australia in acquiring asymmetric capability.
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어떻게 재미있게 읽으셨는지는 모르겠습니다.
저는 호주의 이 문건에서 절박감이라는 감정을 읽을 수 있었습니다.
'모든게 바뀌는데 나는 너무나도 뒤쳐져있다. 그래서 어떻게든 변혁해야한다. 그렇지 못하면 살아남지 못한다.'
심지어 대만의 문건에서도 이런 느낌은 받지 못했습니다(참고로 대만의 문건에선 뜬구름 잡는듯한 느낌을 받았네요). 그만큼 세계는 빠르게 변혁하고 있고, 그것도 위험한 방향으로 변혁하고 있나봅니다.