오늘 시간이 붕뜨는 바람에 뭘할까 고민하다가 간만에 백악관 브리핑을 살펴봤습니다.
그리고 매우 중요해 보이는 대담 하나를 발견했습니다.
바로 미 국가안보보좌관 제이크 설리번이 지난 1월 30일 미국외교협회(Council on Foreign Relations)에서 미-중관계의 미래에 대하여 발언한 대담입니다.
대략 내용은 이제까지 미국이 중국을 향해 무엇을 해왔는지를 브리핑하고, 그 뒤에는 패널들의 질문에 대하여 답한 것들입니다.
워낙 분량이 많고 주어진 시간도 애매해서 이렇다 저렇다 요약까진 못할 거 같습니다. 하지만 중요해 보이는 부분은 복붙해서 기록하고자 합니다.
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We determined that the PRC was the only state with both the intent to reshape the international order and the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. We saw that the PRC sought to “catch up and surpass” the United States in high technology; that it was pursuing the largest peacetime military buildup in history; and that it was more repressive at home and more assertive abroad, including in the South and East China Seas as well as the Taiwan Strait. We saw the PRC working to make the world more dependent on China while reducing its own dependence on the world. And we saw it taking steps to adapt the international system to accommodate its own system and preferences.
We also saw something that really stood out, which is that the PRC believed the United States was in terminal decline — that our industrial base had been hollowed out, that our commitment to our allies and partners had been undercut, that the United States was struggling to manage a once-in-a-century pandemic, and that many in Beijing were openly proclaiming that “the East was rising and the West was falling.”
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So we developed our own approach, which Secretary Blinken laid out in a speech a couple of years ago — invest, align, compete — that sought to strengthen our competitive position and secure our interests and values while carefully managing this vital relationship.
* 미국 국내산업에 투자하고, 동맹과 결집하고, 중국과 경쟁한다.
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And over the past three years, we’ve implemented that approach. We’ve made far-reaching investments in the foundation of American strength at home with historic legislation on infrastructure, chips and science, and clean energy, all while addressing the PRC’s non-market practices and taking steps to ensure that the United States would lead in the sources of technological and economic growth.
We believe our approach has generated results. Large-scale investments in semiconductor and clean-energy production in the United States are up 20-fold since 2019. Construction spending on new manufacturing projects has already doubled. And looking out over the next decade, we’re estimating $3.5 trillion in new public and private investment, unlocked by the investments made in the historic legislation I just referenced.
Abroad, we’ve tried to strengthen our ties with Indo-Pacific allies and partners in ways that would have been unlikely, even inconceivable, a few years ago. We launched AUKUS. We elevated the Quad. We upgraded our relationship with Vietnam, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, and others.
We launched a historic trilateral with Japan and the Republic of Korea that culminated in a historic summit that President Biden hosted at Camp David.
We held summits — multiple summits — with the leaders of the Pacific Islands as well as with ASEAN.
Our regional allies and partners, for their part, are betting on American economic vitality. They’ve announced almost $200 billion of investments into the United States since the start of the administration.
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We’ve also worked to connect our European and Indo-Pacific alliances. And together with our G7 partners, we’ve aligned on collective steps to <de-risk> our economies and diversify away from strategic dependencies <rather than decoupling>. And alongside our allies and partners, we’ve stressed the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
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These steps are not about protectionism, and they’re not about holding anybody back. They’re critical for our national security over the long run.
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For years, economists were predicting that the PRC would overtake the United States in GDP either in this decade or the next. Now those projections are moving further and further out. And with the PRC facing its own set of challenges, some say that moment may never come.
And this brings me to a critical point: America, in this moment, is once more showing its capacity for resilience and reinvention.
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As we took these steps to improve our competitive position, we aimed to do so in a way that built stability into one of the world’s most consequential relationships — perhaps the world’s most consequential relationship. And, in fact, we believe our investments at home and our work to deepen ties with allies and partners abroad actually created the conditions for more effective diplomacy with the PRC.
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We realize that efforts, implied or explicit, to shape or change the PRC over several decades did not succeed. We expect that the PRC will be a major player on the world stage for the foreseeable future. That means that even as we compete, we have to find ways to live alongside one another.
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Competition with the PRC does not have to lead to conflict, confrontation, or a new Cold War. The United States can take steps to advance its interests and values and those of its allies and partners on the one hand, while responsibly managing competition on the other. Being able to do both of those things is at the heart of our approach.
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The year began with the relationship at a historic low point. A year ago this week, a Chinese spy balloon traveled across the United States. We were, and remain, deeply concerned about the PRC providing Russia with lethal aid in its invasion of Ukraine. And after historic and unprecedented — and not historic in a positive sense — PRC military exercises in August of 2022, it seemed a series of cross-Strait crises loomed over the horizon.
All of this set back the progress from the Bali summit between President Biden and President Xi. High-level communication halted, to say nothing of military-to-military ties or cooperation on counternarcotics or climate — all of which the PRC had frozen.
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We set out to stabilize the relationship without sacrificing our capacity to strengthen our alliances, compete vigorously, and defend our interests.
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This intensive diplomacy was about managing tough issues rather than patching up the relationship. We were direct about our differences, including PRC support for Russia’s war against Ukraine and cross-Strait issues.
We did not pull back from national security-focused measures, like restrictions on outbound investment and updates to our export controls. Instead, we used these meetings as opportunities to explain what these measures were, but almost as importantly, what they were not, which was an attempt to undermine the PRC’s prosperity and development. That is not what those measures were, and we explained that clearly to our counterparts in these sessions.
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Second, President Biden and President Xi announced the resumption of military-to-military communication that had been frozen for more than a year. The Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff has now spoken with his counterpart, and we’ve restored a number of critical operator-level mechanisms. The question now is whether that will continue even in the face of future turbulence. We, for our part, will continue to make the case that military-to-military communication is critical at all times but especially in times of tension.
And third, the Woodside summit saw our leaders announce a new dialogue aimed at managing the risks of artificial intelligence, which will start in the spring.
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The most significant risk would be a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, especially given Beijing’s increased military activity in and around its air and waters. Here, too, intensive diplomacy matters.
That is an outcome few may have foreseen in August of 2022, when most expected the cross-Strait situation to grow more tense, not less. But it’s no guarantee of future trends, and the risk remains real. So we have to keep working at this by intensifying both diplomacy and deterrence.
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If PRC provocations continue in the South and East China Seas and the Taiwan Strait, we’ll work closely with allies and partners to push back and speak out about the risks to peace and stability in the world’s most important waterways. We’ll continue to uphold freedom of navigation in the region by flying, sailing, and operating wherever international law allows. And we’ll continue to pursue <tailored> national security measures designed to protect our national security.
And even as we do so, we’ll aim to continue the pace of intensive interaction with the PRC that has helped both sides manage areas of difference and unlock cooperation on areas where our interests align.
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In the period ahead, we hope we can work with the PRC to deepen crisis communication mechanisms to reduce the risk of conflict. We’re ready to coordinate on climate, health security, global macroeconomic stability, and new challenges like the risks posed by artificial intelligence.
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Let me conclude by noting that none of this will be easy, and there will be times of tension. That’s inevitable in a competition like this that is simply not going to resolve in a neat and decisive end state. And as I noted, one thing is certain: There will be <surprises> along the way.
We’ll keep working to manage the competition as we have over the last year. We’ll continue to invest in our strength at home and to deepen our global networks of alliances and partnerships abroad.
The approach I’m describing to you is not some big strategic shift. It’s an effort we began building from the day we came into office. It’s also not something new to American statecraft. Far from it. It’s an approach that is itself uniquely American and rooted in decades of history, diplomacy, and hard-won experience. It’s also rooted in bipartisanship, because when the United States deals in a strategic competition from a position of strong bipartisan support, of all pulling together in service of the country, we always come out stronger for it.
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So we intend to stick with this strategy. We intend to do what we need to do to protect our interests and defend our allies, while at the same time effectively managing competition with China to the good not just of the United States, but to the good of global stability as well. That is our <commitment>. That’s what we’ve tried to do.
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You know, this is my third extended round of conversations with Wang Yi — the first in Vienna, the second in Malta, and then this one in Bangkok. And with each successive round, I think we have increasingly gotten to the point of setting aside the talking points and really having strategic conversations.
In terms of next steps, the main things coming out of the meeting were actually to, you know, kind of fix the launch of this <AI dialogue>, where the U.S. and China will work together to manage risk. And that will get going this spring. So we talked through what the elements of that would look like.
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And then, we obviously also had the opportunity to talk about current events — current events in the Red Sea, current events on the Korean Peninsula, concerns that we have about instability in both places. And I would say the quality and character of those conversations and a rather direct and, in some ways, intensive conversation about the war in Ukraine, I think helped both of us leave feeling that we didn’t agree or see eye-to-eye on everything but that there was a lot of <work to carry forward>.
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Last point I would make: We agreed that President Biden and President Xi should speak and <should speak by telephone> relatively soon. And I think the acknowledgment coming out of Woodside that there really is no substitute for leader-to-leader conversation — I mean, it became so apparent over the course of that meeting at Woodside how central that ingredient has to be to an effective stewardship of U.S.-China policy. And so, both of us agreed that we would report back to our leaders and we would get them on the phone sooner rather than later.
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MR. HADLEY: Great. Let me ask you on the Taiwan question. They recently, of course, had elections in Taiwan. A lot of commentary by some of the people in this room about the significance of those elections. How do you see them? And what impact do you think the results might have on our ability to manage the cross-Strait relationship?
MR. SULLIVAN: (중략) we remained <studiously> neutral throughout.
* 세심한 주의를 기울여 세부 사항에 주의를 기울이거나 고의적으로 또는 의도적으로 수행되는 방식
And otherwise, from the United States’ perspective, Taiwan exhibiting this vibrant, democratic character is a positive thing. And our policy remains constant through it. As it was before, it will be going forward — the One China policy, the Taiwan Relations Act, the Six Assurances, and all of the issues that people in this room know so well.
And President Biden has been clear that, you know, we remain committed to the One China policy. And I was clear on that with Wang Yi as well.
* 주의 : '하나의 중국' 정책은 중국버전과 '하나의 중국에 대한 미국의 정책'을 뜻하는 미국버전이 따로 존재함.
** 참고 : https://cafe.daum.net/shogun/OCbn/465
And we generally want to see, as I think the rest of the world does, peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. And we are <committed> to doing everything we can to support that.
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MR. HADLEY: Good for you.
I’m going to give you one more chance to make some news. (Laughter.)
Should we — on this issue of technology in particular, should we expect further steps by the Biden administration to de-risk the U.S. economy from its overdependence on China? And in what areas are we likely to see further action?
MR. SULLIVAN: I just want to take a minute on what we mean by <de-risking>. And, in fact, I’ve said this directly to my Chinese counterparts. It basically has three elements.
First, investing in America’s industrial and innovation capacity. A big way to de-risk is to have more capacity ourselves to be able to, you know, operate at the technological innovation edge.
The second is to diversify supply chains so that we’re not dependent on any single point of failure. And that’s not all about China. That’s a lesson we learned from COVID. But the PRC is a part of that.
And the third is to have a series of tailored measures so that American technology cannot be used to undermine the security of the United States and our allies. And in this category, we have been transparent that we’ve taken a series of steps already, and we will take further steps as we go forward, all according to the basic principle that we are going to tailor them and target them in a way that they really are aimed at our national security concerns and not at a broader effort to decouple our technological ecosystems or our economies. But I will leave for a later day what exactly the nature and timetable of additional measures will be.
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Our job is to try to understand, in a clear-eyed way, what those risks and inherent tensions are, and do our very best to manage them without compromising on our fundamental values and without walking away from the defense of the American national interest and the interest of our allies and partners.
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we’re going to compete but we also are going to inhabit the same planet, and we have to work together to ensure that we don’t end up tipping over into conflict.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you very much. My name is Marc Rotenberg. I’m with the Center for AI and Digital Policy.
it’s important to maintain discussion about the risk of AI in warfare.
AI can support an open and pluralist government or AI can support a more closed, constrained form of government.
And many of our democratic allies are looking for a robust treaty that safeguards fundamental rights in this era of AI.
Will the U.S. government support a robust treaty on AI that safeguards fundamental rights?
MR. SULLIVAN: And we do have a very different vision of AI governance than the PRC does, which is why our dialogue with them will really vector in on our, kind of, responsibility as significant countries and major AI players to manage the risks of AI as we go forward.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Thank you so much for being with us today. I’m Wafa Ben-Hassine. I’m at the Omidyar Network. I’m also a UC-San Diego alum, political science. So thank you to the CFR for bringing San Diego to us, even if you couldn’t be there.
My question actually takes us to a different geography. In Africa, we see China moving beyond the Belt and Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road.
I’m curious if you could illuminate a little bit about the U.S.’s positioning in Africa and how we would potentially like to secure our national security and also promote human rights in Africa in response to these types of interventions. Thank you.
MR. SULLIVAN: One thing that Kurt and I wrote in our Foreign Affairs piece in 2019 that I have felt, like, really important to keep us disciplined in this is that we cannot treat the rest of the world as <proxy battlegrounds> the way that I think the U.S. and the Soviet Union too often did during the Cold War.
So the question we pose instead is: How do we offer a better value proposition?
And we have worked very closely with the new head of the World Bank, who President Biden, you know, played an active role in helping get into the job, Ajay Banga. We’re trying to expand the World Bank’s capacity to do this. We’ve worked with the G7 through PGI, the Project [sic] on Global Infrastructure and Investment, to do this.
It should be: how do we actually show up and offer something that will respond to the legitimate development needs of that country.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: But people have heard enough of me talking about it, Jake. So that’s where I want to circle back to you.
So you come to the conference, and one economist thinks one thing. Another, another. But isn’t that true of political scientists and security experts out here too, that you’re going to have a whole spectrum?
And to fight a — to wage a systemic competition, don’t you have to come down to a sort of point of view about how their economic system is doing in order to figure out how well we’re performing in that competition?
MR. SULLIVAN: But I would say that we also need a multidirectional strategy that can apply if our assumptions turn out to be wrong. And I would also say that this has been a uniquely difficult time, to be quite precise on this, because of COVID-19, the pandemic, how all the pieces fit into place.
But broadly speaking, what I said in my remarks and what I said in answer to Steve’s question I would just reinforce, which is we came into office not accepting what I think was a kind of broad-based conventional wisdom about relative trajectories of the U.S. and the PRC. The President didn’t accept that. I didn’t accept that. Our team did not. And we continue to push back against this idea about inexorable rise, terminal decline as being central — a central characteristic of the relationship.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hey, Jake. Kim Dozier, CNN analyst and CFR member.
I wanted to ask what your message was regarding China’s continuing support for U.S. adversaries, specifically Russia, including Beijing helping Moscow avoid some of the technology sanctions and providing, while not weapons, but basic equipment like heavy-duty trucks for Russia’s war on Ukraine, and China’s support for Iran with rising petroleum purchases, whereas you’ve recently blamed Iran for supporting the deadly attacks that cost the lives of U.S. troops this past weekend. Thanks.
MR. SULLIVAN: where we sent a clear message about our concern that China might provide lethal aid for use against civilians in Ukraine. We have not seen the provision of lethal aid.
But as I said in my remarks, and as you noted in your question, we have seen support from Chinese companies to help Russia reconstitute its defense industrial base. And we have been clear and direct about our concerns.
With respect to Iran, one of the areas of substantial focus in the discussion was about the continuing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the disruption of a vital artery of maritime commerce, undermining of supply chain security in the global economy, and frankly, disruption to China-Europe trade, which the Red Sea is obviously, you know, critical to. And made the case that, you know, China is a responsible player; as a U.N. Security Council member, has an obligation to use the influence it has in Tehran to get those in Tehran to use the influence they have with the Houthis to push back against this kind of behavior.
And I won’t, you know, characterize the response because I’ll leave that to Wang Yi to do for himself, but I will just say that was a detailed and substantive conversation, because it is a matter where we believe that countries, particularly permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, have unique responsibilities and should step up to those responsibilities.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Jake. Art Collins with theGROUP.
Talk to us a little bit about the trilateral relationship with South Korea and Japan. As we know, you mentioned it earlier, the Prime Minister of Japan will be here in the spring for a state visit. Japan is obviously increasing — in fact, maybe doubling — its military budget. But what else do we expect from our partners in that regard, in both South Korea and Japan? And what are we prepared to do, beyond what we’ve already done, with that <critical relationship>?
MR. SULLIVAN: I think it’s important to recognize that the security dimension of that trilateral relationship is critical. It has been a source of propulsion for pulling the three countries together. And it manifests in closer intelligence coordination, closer defense cooperation, exercises, joint deterrence, particularly when it comes to the Korean Peninsula. And <we’d like to> see that continue to evolve.
But I would also point out that the trilateral partnership expands well beyond that. First, it expands <beyond the region>. If you look at support for Ukraine, Japan and Korea have both stepped up in significant ways to stand with a fellow democracy in Europe. And the Japanese prime minister has been particularly articulate in explaining that what happens in Ukraine matters in the Indo-Pacific. And President Yoon has reinforced that.
And then finally, the relationship extends to economic coercion, the intersection of technology and national security, innovation, economic investment and vitality — all areas where the three countries have a huge amount of complementary capacity to support and lift one another up.
When you put all that together, that is a formidable partnership of three countries with shared values; huge capacities across economics, technology, national security; and global reach.
And so, you know, we’re very proud of the work that we’ve done so far, but it is very much a work in progress and has to be built on from strength to strength as we go forward.
I was just recently in Seoul for a trilateral meeting of national security advisors to convert this into the details of how we work together on things like early warning for missile defense and also to think about areas where we can work together — for example, to answer the question that was posed earlier: How do we collectively have a value proposition in the developing world with three large ODA budgets from our three countries?
So, you know, that is not — that trilateral partnership is not about any country. It’s not about China. It’s not about North Korea. It’s about being for something — <a vision for the world>, for the region, but for the world writ large. And we feel that it has helped create a huge amount of momentum behind shared priorities, and we want to continue to develop that.
* 우리는 세계에서 우리나라의 역할이 얼마나 막중한지 가장 모르는 사람들일 겁니다.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: You briefly mentioned human rights, so I would like to hear your strategy towards Chinese abuse of human rights — Uyghurs, Tibetans, Christian minorities. How are we going to face that challenge?
MR. SULLIVAN: That’s not about trying to weaponize the issue; it’s about living out our values. And that’s the ethos that he has tried to inculcate across the U.S. government as we deal with this issue.
we have done that in partnership with the Congress on a bipartisan basis, including laws that have been passed under our administration that we are now implementing, on issues like forced labor, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.
So this is something that will remain a critical priority and feature of the U.S.-China relationship, as it has through multiple administrations. And from our perspective, having direct diplomacy and intensive management of the relationship is not inconsistent with standing up for speaking out on and taking material action on issues related to the protection of human rights.
* 인권이 무기화시키지 않을 것이다라. 인권침해를 당하고 있는 당사자들에게는 가장 절망적인 문장일지도 모르겠요.
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