최신소식란에 올렸는 데 여기에 올리는 게 더 성격이 맞을 것 같아서 옮깁니다
인도에 있어서 중앙 아시아 지역에 대한 입장과 이 지역이 갖는 전략적 함의에 대한 논평입니다. 필자는 인도 국방연구원의 선임 펠로우로써 해당 지역에 있어 지역 차원의 전략을 가질 것을 촉구하며 인도의 "균형자"적 역할을 부각시키고 있으며 이는 특히 최근 몇 년 사이 중국이 이 지역에서의 역할을 증대시켜 나가는 데 대한 대응적 역할을 강조하는 측면이 보입니다.
India’s Balancing Role in the Central Asian Power Game
P Stobdan December 14, 2005
In 2001, Uzbekistan opted to become the linchpin of US policy goals in Central Asia. It was then argued that Washington would guarantee the nurturing of geo-political pluralism in the region. This was viewed against the backdrop of the historical ascendancy of China and the imperial decline of Russia. Much has happened since then. Today the US is facing a deadline to quit its airbase in Karshi-Khanabad (K-2), set up in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, because of Tashkent’s suspicion that Washington had plotted the revolt in Andijan on May 13, which led to a bloody massacre. Following protracted information warfare, the US helped airlift 439 Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan to Romania on 29 July in the garb of a UN operation. Hours later, an infuriated Karimov gave the US 180 days to quit. Karimov finally discovered America’s opportunistic aspect and feared that a plot was aimed at regime change a la Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.
In Central Asia, things are likely to get worse before they get better. In a recent conference at Tashkent, Russian strategic pundits displayed utmost self-confidence in predicting a triumphant Russian re-entry into the region. The Andijan crisis may have triggered the current Uzbek-US rift, but political pressure from Moscow has probably played a part in exacerbating it further. Moscow, it seems, has taken full advantage of US entanglement in Iraq to re-claim Central Asia within its sphere of influence. Signs of an Uzbek rapprochement with Russia were visible from last year when Karimov favoured Russia’s Gazprom and LUKoil rather than US firms for long-term investments in Uzbekistan’s gas fields. Gossip doing the rounds is that Karimov’s daughter, Gulnara, who is facing an arrest warrant for contempt of court over a divorce case, managed to cut a major business deal with a Russian oligarch. This was a vital factor for the change in Uzbek foreign policy orientation.
In the current balance of advantage, Islam Karimov has hopped off the fence to embrace Russia and is using the China-driven SCO to contain American presence in the region. The Tashkent conference was sponsored by the Moscow based think tank Fund Politika led by Vyacheslav Nikonov, who inter alia was in Tashkent in June to spin-doctor the Uzbek counterattack against Western media.
The Uzbeks appear to have run out of options in their initial approach of playing a ‘multi-strategic’ game, which they thought would serve several objectives ranging from curbing terrorism, WMD, fundamentalism and drug trafficking. They perceive the US as not reciprocating their support for the war against terror, and instead, see it playing the old game. Tashkent’s accusation that a joint US, NATO, and EU resolution seeking investigation into the Andijan killings was prepared prior to the unrest, cannot be verified. By giving 180 days deadline for the US to leave, Tashkent seems to have left no room for a diplomatic settlement of the imbroglio. The US says it is prepared to vacate K-2. Some Uzbeks probably still feel that moderation is required if there is to be any hope of bridging the rift.
The turning point for Washington was the July 5 SCO summit in Astana, when Central Asian states, guided by China and Russia, set a deadline for ending US military presence in the region. The Chinese perceive the US motivation for seeking regime change in Central Asia as a stepping-stone for pursuing its policy goals in Xinjiang, where a movement for independent Uighuristan is gaining momentum. Uzbekistan might have given the US six months to leave, but Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, following Rumsfeld’s visit on July 25, continue to favour the US presence until stability returns to Afghanistan. Bishkek is seeking amendments in the air base agreement to allow for more payments by US. Perhaps, more alarming to Washington was Peace Mission 2005 ? the first ever Sino-Russian military manoeuvres in August, which made Rumsfeld rush to East Asia to ascertain the seriousness of the situation firsthand.
Unable to match Russian and Chinese localized strengths, the US is relying on its strategy of promoting democracy and human rights to bring about democratic change in Central Asia. Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice toured the region last month to boost the morale of opposition and democratic forces and did not hide their support for pro-democracy and civil society groups. Last month, Congressman Christopher Smith (Republican) announced legislation to halt both military and humanitarian aid to Central Asian governments that fail to democratise or respect human rights.
Meanwhile, rumours about the US seeking alternative bases elsewhere and a new air base in Turkmenistan have been immediately addressed by Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dashed to Ashghabat on October 21, where he was assured by Turkmanbashi that such a move was not on the cards. This fear arose when Turkmenistan recently renounced its membership of the CIS. The overwhelming impression one is left with is that Andijan has led to paranoia among Uzbeks. They admit committing certain mistakes but are willing to seek support and ideas to overcome the tragedy. The Taliban’s resurgence, neighbours armed with nuclear weapons and the infiltration of terrorists belonging to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Akramiya trained in Pakistan, remain Uzbekistan’s real concerns. Tashkent perceives contrasting policies being pursued by Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan; while the former is trying to distance itself from the region, the latter has become a member of the WTO and is actively engaged in opening itself up to the world. In Tashkent’s view, these contrasting policies create more problems rather than addressing issues concerning regional integration. Moscow sees Central Asia as its natural domain and as such cautions the US against over-stretching itself. Russians fear US involvement might end up orienting Central Asia towards the Middle Eastern political culture and envisage the Iraq situation sparking up sectarian conflict across the region from Pakistan to Uzbekistan. Russian thinkers prefer the region orienting itself to the North East Asian dynamic as part of its second phase integration programme for Central Asia. Moreover, Russians pin much hope on the time-tested long history of a harmonious relationship between Central Asian Islam and Orthodox Christianity. The fact that for over a hundred years, Muslims of Central Asia were closer to Russia than even many Russians living in Russia brings optimism for the new Russian plan to be successful. However, for Uzbeks, reintegration with Russia could be possible only if Moscow realizes and overcomes past Soviet mistakes in dealing with the region. A Russia-centric economic plan for Central Asia is certainly not something the Uzbeks want. Uzbek preconditions are many including their desire to develop transportation links to the Indian Ocean and also Russia’s ability to resolve difficult Uzbek-Kazakh relations.
The key question remains whether Moscow, before going ahead, would trust Karimov since he proved quite deceitful in the past. Karimov severed all ties with Russia, opted out of the Collective Security Treaty and played on anti-Russian rhetoric that led to over 2 million ethnic Russians being forced to leave Uzbekistan. What kind of prize would Tashkent be willing to pay for Russian and Chinese support? The Russian Foreign Minister was in Tashkent on 21 October to chart a future roadmap. Moscow would prefer to first let US forces leave K-2 before talking about Tashkent’s re-entry into CSTO. It is only then that Moscow will seek to install in Tashkent a leader of its choice.
For the time being, both the US and Uzbekistan are hoping to gain something by demonising the Andijan event. It is quite possible that the adept Karimov finds it necessary to balance off big-country interests at this point of time. I carried home the impression that Uzbeks themselves are somewhat unsure about the implications of fully going along with Russia once again. Prominent Uzbek experts like Farkhad Tolipov, who criticised Karimov’s miscalculation in denouncing the US, seemed to have been purged, as he was conspicuously absent in the conference.
There appears to be a near-unanimity about India’s potential role of playing the role of a balancer in the regional power game in Central Asia. Analysts (within and outside the region) wonder about India’s reluctance to play the great game on the Central Asian chessboard, considering the undeniable geo-political significance of the region with its huge energy resources. India enjoys a ready psychological acceptance in the region, as compared to the utter distrust felt towards China and Pakistan. Most outside experts noted India’s potential ability to contribute to the stability of Central Asia, in contrast to what it is doing now. It must be underlined that in Central Asia the Soviet legacy of thinking and operating through a structured framework continues to dominate people’s mindset.Most outside experts noted India’s potential ability to contribute to the stability of Central Asia, in contrast to what it is doing now. It must be underlined that in Central Asia the Soviet legacy of thinking and operating through a structured framework continues to dominate people’s mindset. India, as an emerging power, ought to be interested in defining its own geopolitical goal in Central Asia, instead of moving in a piecemeal ‘bilateral’ fashion. India’s bidding for PetroKazakhstan Company is being seen as symptomatic of its inclination to play the Central Asian game.
In this reconfiguration and regional power game, which is as yet, at a nascent stage, a point that worries everyone, including the US, Russia and Central Asians themselves, is the new factor of China’s growing influence. China is clearly seeking interests beyond Central Asia.
P. Stobdan is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. The Commentary is based on author’s participation in the International Conference on the “Problems of Security in Central Asia” held in Tashkent on October 20-22, 2005.
출처는 인도 국방 연구원(IDSA)의 Strategic COMments December 14, 2005
이 문제에 대한 보다 (인도 입장에 대한) 자세한 분석과 평가는 역시 같은 저자가 인도 국방 연구원 발행의 Strategic Analysis 2004. Jan.에 기고한 Central Asia and India’s Security(첨부파일)를 보시길 바랍니다
인도에 있어 타지키스탄의 전략적 가치와 이란 루트 , 항공 기지 병설 건에 관한 인도측 시각에 대해서는 OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION에서 내놓은 아래 글을 참고하시길 바랍니다.
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Engaging Tajikistan: Strategic Implications
A number of important treaties of immense strategic significance have been signed during Prime Minister Vajpayee’s first ever visit to Tajikistan on November 14. The agreements signed were related to setting up a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, a bilateral extradition treaty and military ties. Indian government has also announced building a highway from Iran to Tajikistan through Afghanistan. While Tajikistan has traditionally been supportive of India on many issues bilateral relations between them especially in the field of trade and commerce have not yet reached their full potential. With Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit bilateral relations are bound to improve.
Indo-Tajikistan relations assume significance essentially due to three reasons. Firstly, the proposed highway from Chabahar through Afghanistan to Tajikistan (Chabahar-Kabul-Kunduz-Badakhshan) will enable India to have a transport corridor to the otherwise inaccessible Central Asian region. As the proposed highway starts from Chabahar ? where an Iranian port is being built by India ? which is close to the Pakistani port at Gwadar being built with Chinese help, it is also seen as a counter strategy by India to limit Chinese influence in the Pakistani waters close to India and Iran. The transport corridor through Iran, which stands to further strengthen India’s current engagements with it, also enables India to have a strong ally in the Islamic world though it might annoy the US. Indo-Iranian relations, thus, assume significance both in political and commercial terms.
This proposed transport corridor in which India would have substantial stakes also stands to balance Chinese engagements in the Central Asian region. The focus of Chinese energy engagement in Central Asia is Kazakhstan. In 1997, Beijing won the bid for the Uzen oilfield which is Kazakhstan’s second-largest oil reserve after Tengiz. China also won the bid to develop Kazakhstan’s Aktyubinst oil field and has acquired 30% interest in the Kursangi and Karabagli oil fields in Azerbaijan. China is actively planning to construct about 3,000kms of gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Xinjiang. While China tries to engage the Central Asian region and its hydrocarbon resources through Kazakhstan, India’s strategy is to engage the region through Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan.
Secondly, engagements with Tajikistan will help India to strengthen its presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Latest reports from Afghanistan indicate that the US and the Karzai government in Afghanistan are promoting ‘moderate Taliban’ in Afghanistan and even inviting them to join the government. While the government in Kabul has confirmed that former Taliban officials have contacted the Afghan government and offered to cooperate with it to stem attacks on aid workers and government forces, the mediator between Karzai and Taliban seems to be former Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil who has been reportedly offered a place in the Afghan government.
Thirdly, engaging Tajikistan in military collaboration will give added strength to Indian interests in the Central Asian region. Reports indicate that military engineers are engaged in renovating a Tajik air base at a cost of $10 million and plans to build accommodation facilities to station troops are also underway. The air base, close to the Tajik capital Dushanbe, would station both fighter and transport aircrafts. However, both India and Tajikistan have denied reports that India is in the process of building a military base in Tajikistan. Apart from ‘repairing’ the airbase, in February this year Indian and Tajik forces held joint military exercises, and Tajik military officers already receive training in India. While this nominal Indian military relationship with Tajikistan is certainly not enough to balance US and Russian engagements with the region, it is certainly necessary to continue to engage it. Geographically, Tajikistan also assumes importance as it borders China, Pakistan and Afghanistan and Ferghana Valley which is a hotbed of terrorism.
그나저나 Chabahar 항 건에 관해서는 파키스탄을 앞세운 중국 역내 영향력 견제는 미국과 이해가 맞긴 하지만 그 대안으로 선택하는 게 이란 루트라니.. 참 미국으로써도 딜레머적인 상황이긴 하겟군요.
이 건이 다시 차바하르 -아프간 -타지크 루트와 연결되고 있다는 점에서 타지크에 인도 항공 기지가 있다는 점 또 한 주목되는 건이기도 합니다. (아프간에 대한 인도의 원조가 이 건에 대하여 어떻게 작용할 런지도 관심이 가군요. 해당 루트 통과 지역이 주로 북부 동맹 장악 지역이라 최악의 경우 탈레반 재부상시에도 인도의 영향력을 유지할 수 있는 기반이 될 거라고 하니 )
그나저나 인도도 이 게임에 있어 슬슬 주요 플레이어로 등장하려는 모습을 보니 이 게임은 더욱 복잡해지는군요. 테마도 단순한 에너지 루트를 떠나서 역내 무역로- 외부 세계와의 연계- 유라시아. 중앙 남부 아시아 지역의 물류 수송.교차로와 연계되어 보다 확대되고 있고요
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작성자백선호 작성시간 06.06.18 읽다 보니까 탈리반도 "moderate Taliban"이 있고 "extreme Taliban"이 있네요. 이 둘은 어떤 이슈에서 서로 다른 견해를 가졌길래 이렇게 나뉘었죠?
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작성자HENRY(전윤근) 작성자 본인 여부 작성자 작성시간 06.06.22 moderate Taliban라는 건 실제적인 정책적 노선의 차이나 탈레반 내부의 의견 대립에 의한 분파라기 보다는 현실적 필요에 의하여 붙여진 측면이 큽니다. 탈레반 정권이 붕괴한 이후 소수민족인 타지크 우즈벡 중심의 북부동맹이 전면적으로 아프간의 정권을 잡아서 다수민족인 파쉬툰 족이 소외될 걸 우려한 파키스탄 그리고 미국일각에서 다수 족인 파쉬툰을 생각해서라도 탈레반 중 그나마 말이 통하고 덜 과격한 이들, 특히(탈레반 정권 시절 초기에) 서방및 외부와의 협력을 표시한 이들, 그리고 (전쟁 전후하여) 오마르를 중심으로 한 과격한 투쟁노선과 거리를 둔 이들을 일부나마 정부에 참여시켜 거국적인 체제를 구성하자는 주장이
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작성자HENRY(전윤근) 작성자 본인 여부 작성자 작성시간 06.06.23 나왔고 그래서 moderate Taliban이라는 말이 쓰이게 된 것으로 기억합니다. 실제로 카르자이가 수반이 될 수 있ㅆ었던 게 그 자신이 파쉬툰 족 출신이라는 게 크게 작용한 것으로 알려져 있습니다. 그 이후 과도정부를 거치면서 국민적 화합과 안정을 위하여 일부 탈레반 온건파를 사면하고 국정 참여시키고 선거에 참가케 하자는 방안이 거론된 바 있습니다. (그 대표적인 인물이 위에 나온 탈레반 정권 당시 외무장관 무타와킬이었습니다) 그러나 이 안은 결국 실현되지 못헀고 일부 탈레반 세력이 다시 무장저항을전개하여 현재는 더욱 사태가 악화되고 있는 걸로 압니다.